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I. Introduction 
A. Wayne, New Jersey Case Study 
On October 29, 2011, an altercation took place among high school 
students at a weekend house party
1
 that erupted into a community 
dispute reflecting significant legal and policy questions for the proper 
role of school districts in private life. According to police, two Wayne, 
New Jersey high schoolers were attacked at an off-campus house party, 
with one individual knocked unconscious.
2
 Approximately one week 
later, police charged nine teenagers with aggravated assault.
3
 After the 
criminal charges were filed, controversy erupted as some of the students 
charged were stars on the Wayne Hills High School football team and 
were slated to play in upcoming playoff football games.
4
 
On November 11, 2011, Interim School Superintendent Michael 
Roth decided against suspending the football players.
5
 Roth cited legal 
precedent and a New Jersey administrative statute restricting school 
discipline for off-campus offenses.
6
 As a result, the students participated 
in the first playoff football game, which the team won.
7
 However, on 
November 16, 2011, Roth reversed his earlier decision and suspended 
the players, banning them from participating in the next playoff game.
8
 
School board members remained silent for the most part, although some 
told the press that they supported the reversal by Roth.
9
 
 
 
1 Matthew McGrath, 9 Wayne Hills students, including star football player, arrested on 
assault charges, THE RECORD, Nov. 9, 2011, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/9_Wayne_Hills_students_.html.  
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Matthew McGrath and Hannan Adely, Superintendent: Law allows accused Wayne 
Hills students to play, THE RECORD, Nov. 11, 2011, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/Arrested_Wayne_Hills_High_players_can_
take_part_in_tonights_playoff_game.html. 
5 Id. 
6 Id.; see N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6. 
7 Matthew McGrath, Officials silent on plans for accused Wayne Hills players, THE 
RECORD, Nov. 15, 2011, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/133942503_Officials_silent_on_football_decision.html. 
8 Matthew McGrath, Accused Wayne Hills players barred from football, THE RECORD, 
Nov. 16, 2011, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/111611_Accused_Wayne_Hills_players_ba
rred_from_football.html. 
9 Id. 
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After the superintendent’s actions, the Board of Education met on 
November 16, 2011 and November 17, 2011 to discuss Roth’s new 
decision to suspend the players.
10
 At these meetings, Wayne Hills 
football players packed the public portion of the school board meeting 
in protest of the suspensions.
11
 Chris Olsen, the school’s athletic director 
and football coach, spoke out and called the suspensions a “rush to 
justice.”
12
 He added, “Let’s say some of the boys, or all of them, are 
found not guilty. What do we say to them? ‘We’re sorry?’”
13
 Supporters 
of the players argued they should have “a chance to refute the charges,” 
and cited the Duke University lacrosse controversy where players 
accused of rape were suspended and later acquitted.
14
 Additionally, in a 
closed Board of Education session, lawyers for some of the accused 
players presented evidence that “at least three boys were not present 
during the alleged attack,” and this “created doubt in the board’s mind” 
about suspending the players.
15
 Based on this new information, the 
Board stayed Roth’s suspension and scheduled another hearing.
16
 
Consequently, the accused players were allowed to play in a 
November 18 playoff football game, which the team also won.
17
 At this 
point, the football controversy “made national news,” with the Board 
conceding that “the ‘majority of people’ were upset with its handling of 
the matter.”
18
 In this light, on November 25, the Board lifted its stay on 
Roth’s suspension, rendering the players ineligible for a December 3 
championship game.
19
 In response, the players filed suit, seeking 
emergent relief with the Commissioner of Education on November 28, 
 
10 Id. 
11 Matthew McGrath and Erik Shilling, 60 Wayne Hills players crowd into meeting, 
THE RECORD, Nov. 17, 2011, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime_courts/111611_Accused_Wayne_Hills_players_ba
rred_from_football.html. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Matthew McGrath, Wayne Hills football team plays after week of controversy, THE 
RECORD, Nov. 18, 2011, http://www.northjersey.com/sports/WAYNEHILLS.html. 
16 Id. 
17 Matthew McGrath and Patricia Alex, Assault case puts Wayne Hills football dynasty 
in tough spot, THE RECORD, Nov. 27, 2011, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/112711_Assault_case_puts_Wayne_Hills_football_dynas
ty_in_tough_spot.html.  
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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2011, and the Superior Court on November 29, 2011.
20
 
Hearing the lawsuit the next day on November 30, Superior Court 
Judge Thomas Brogan met with attorneys for the Board and players but 
did not make a ruling.
21
 Brogan instead deferred to the Commissioner of 
Education, citing state policy that when an issue arises under school 
laws, the Department of Education should have primary 
jurisdiction.
22
Accordingly, both sides met with Administrative Law 
Judge Ellen Bass on December 1, 2011.
23
 That day, Bass heard 
arguments and denied the players’ request for emergent relief.
24
 
Subsequently, in a determination rendered on December 2, the 
Commissioner of Education affirmed Bass’ decision, and thus, the 
players were ultimately suspended for the championship game on 
December 3.
25
 
After three reversals in decision, the Wayne Hills School District 
ultimately punished the students for their alleged conduct that occurred 
entirely off school grounds. This punishment follows a new trend in 
New Jersey and around the country in which school districts are 
increasingly involving themselves in matters that occur beyond the 
educational environment.
26
 In response to the Wayne Hills controversy 
and other similar situations, a national debate has developed on whether 
school districts should be assuming the role of disciplining students for 
their misdeeds outside of school.
27
 There is passion on both sides of this 
 
20 Mike Vorkunov, Suspended Wayne Hills football players appeal Board of 
Education’s decision in court, THE STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 29, 2011, 
http://www.nj.com/hssports/blog/football/index.ssf/2011/11/suspended_wayne_hills_footbal
l_players_appeal_board_of_educations_decision_in_court.html. 
21 John Petrick, Wayne Hills students’ case to be subject of Newark hearing, THE 
RECORD, Nov. 30, 2011, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/Judge_defers_to_education_commissioner_on_Wayne_H
ills_suspensions.html.  
22 Id. 
23 Mike Vorkunov, Judge denies Wayne Hills football players’ appeal to play in state 
final, STAR-LEDGER, Dec. 1, 2011, 
http://www.nj.com/hssports/blog/football/index.ssf/2011/12/judge_denies_wayne_hills_foot
ball_players_appeal_to_play_in_state_final.html.  
24 Id. 
25 Matthew McGrath, Education commissioner bars Wayne Hills players from 
championship, THE RECORD, Dec. 2, 2011, 
http://www.northjersey.com/news/passaic_morris/passaic_news/Education_commissioner_b
ars_Wayne_Hills_players_from_championship.html. 
26 Laura Bruno, Schools enforce year-round conduct rules, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 2010, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2010-10-11-school-discipline.htm. 
27 Such school disciplinary policies are often referred to as 24/7 policies or “24-hour 
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issue. Some school administrators argue that school districts should be 
involved in off-campus affairs, as they believe school districts can better 
reach kids through discipline.
28
 Critics charge this type of school 
involvement goes too far and infringes on parental rights.
29
 
B. Current 24-Hour Codes in New Jersey 
Most New Jersey 24-hour codes passed by individual school 
districts sanction discipline for alleged drug and alcohol violations away 
from school. The Randolph Board of Education in New Jersey, for 
example, passed a policy that disciplined student athletes for drug and 
alcohol possession at all times.
30
 Similarly in Haddonfield, New Jersey, 
student athletes and parents are required to sign an agreement stating 
that students will be disciplined for possession or use of tobacco, 
alcohol, illegal drugs, and anabolic steroids.
31
 Finally, the Ramapo 
Indian Hills Regional High School District passed a regulation that held 
any violation of the New Jersey criminal code or a municipal code as a 
student violation subject to discipline.
32
 
Other New Jersey 24-hour codes discipline students for traffic 
offenses away from school. The Freehold Regional High School District 
in New Jersey disciplines students for motor vehicle violations pursuant 
 
codes,” a term this note will hereafter use. Julia Terruso, From Cranford to Ohio, school 
districts weigh disciplining teens for off-campus behavior, STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 26, 2012, 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/02/cranford_school_district_weigh.html. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 The policy “disciplines high school student athletes and those in extracurricular 
activities if they are caught using or in possession of drugs or alcohol – even if an incident 
occurs off campus after school or on weekends.”12 No. 3 Quinlan, Student Discipline Law 
Bulletin art 5. (Mar. 2010).  
31 The “24/7 Drug and Alcohol Policy” prohibits “the use of tobacco in any form, 
drinking, possessing or providing alcoholic beverages and/or use, possession, or providing 
illegal drugs including anabolic steroids, at any time.” Doe v. Banos, 713 F. Supp. 2d 404, 
408 (D.N.J. 2010).  
32 The policy banned “student participants in Board-sponsored extracurricular activities 
. . . from the use, possession or distribution of any alcoholic beverage or other drugs (unless 
prescribed by a physician) both on and off school grounds . . . With respect to conduct 
occurring away from school grounds/events, an alleged violation of the above conduct 
requirements shall occur if a student is formally charged and/or arrested by law enforcement 
for an alleged violation of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, and/or applicable 
municipal codes or ordinance provisions.” G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of 
Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. II), EDU 11597-09, Final 
Decision (Sept. 13, 2010) (policy was found to be unlawful by the New Jersey 
Commissioner of Education). 
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to an agreement with police, under which the school district receives a 
list of students who receive traffic citations from the local police 
department.
33
 The district then suspends a student’s campus parking 
permit for thirty days for any off-campus moving violation, and if the 
violation involves an accident, the school revokes the student’s parking 
permit “for the year or until [the] legal system determines student to be 
innocent of charges.”
34
 Similarly in Holmdel, New Jersey, the Board of 
Education passed a policy that revokes a student’s on-campus parking 
privilege for thirty days after two reported traffic offenses.
35
 
C. Overview of Note 
With a principal focus on New Jersey law, this Note will first 
discuss how 24-hour codes create potential constitutional violations and 
public policy problems. Next, this Note will review state laws that 
currently exist to address the issue of 24-hour codes. Then, this Note 
will review instances where school districts have exceeded the scope of 
state laws that sanction discipline for off-campus conduct. Finally, this 
Note will reach conclusions about the merits of 24-hour codes and 
suggest legislation to protect all the stakeholders in the educational 
process by creating clarity that would prevent disputes such as the 
Wayne Hills football controversy from occurring in the future. 
II. 24-Hour Codes Create Constitutional Violations and Poor Policy 
In a wide range of litigation, parents and students have argued that 
24-hour codes are unconstitutional. Specifically, they have alleged such 
codes violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution by failing to satisfy procedural or substantive due process. 
This section will review the relevant case law and discuss how school 
districts are potentially sanctioning unconstitutional discipline under 24-
hour codes. Then, this section will review various public policy 
 
33 Freehold Regional High School District, Senior Driving Privileges/Campus Vehicle 
Procedures (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.frhsd.com/district/files/Senior%20Driving%20PrivilegesCampus%20Vehicle%2
0Procedures.pdf. 
34 Id. 
35 The author of this Note opposed the Holmdel off-campus driving disciplinary policy 
as a member of the Holmdel Township Board of Education. Jacqueline Hlavenka, Holmdel 
BOE keeps student driving policy, INDEPENDENT (Monmouth Cty., N.J.), July 15, 2010, 
http://ind.gmnews.com/news/2010-07-
15/Schools/Holmdel_BOE_keeps_student_driving_policy.html. 
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considerations as they relate to 24-hour codes. 
A. Procedural Due Process Challenges to 24-Hour Codes 
Students have alleged they are unconstitutionally denied 
procedural due process during the disciplinary process under 24-hour 
codes.
36
 This student due process right is derived from Goss v. Lopez, 
where the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a suspended student is entitled to “oral or written notice of 
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the 
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of 
the story.”
37
 The Court, however, “stopped short of requiring” that a 
student be given a formal opportunity to secure counsel, confront 
witnesses, or call witnesses.
38
 
The main caveat is that this procedural due process right is 
contingent on the school discipline involving the deprivation of a 
constitutionally protected property interest.
39
 In Goss, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a student’s ten-day scholastic suspension triggers a 
property interest.
40
 As a result, suspended students are afforded notice 
and a hearing.
41
 It is unclear, though, whether procedural due process 
applies to extracurricular activities, which are typically the subject of 
discipline under 24-hour codes.
42
 
In a relevant Third Circuit case, Palmer by Palmer v. Merluzzi, a 
student was caught consuming beer and smoking marijuana inside the 
school radio station.
43
 The student received a procedural due process 
 
36 See L.A. ex rel R.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Wayne, EDU 14241-11, Initial Decision (Dec. 
1, 2011). 
37 Palmer by Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)). 
38 Id. at 93-94 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 584). 
39 “The threshold issue is whether the interests that could be adversely affected in the 
proceeding [are] such that the due process clause was implicated.” Id. at 93; see U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property . . . without due 
process of law”). 
40 Id. at 93 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 581). 
41 Lisa L. Swem, Note, Due Process Rights in Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J.C. & 
U.L. 359, 366 (1987). 
42 “The question of whether a student has a protectable interest in his continuing 
participation in extracurricular activities has been faced by numerous courts with differing 
results.” Palmer by Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1989) (Cowen, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
43 Id. at 91-92. 
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hearing, and thereafter was suspended from school for ten days.
44
 Later, 
the superintendent added a sixty-day extracurricular activities 
suspension on top of the academic suspension.
45
 The student sued, 
arguing he did not receive procedural due process when the 
superintendent decided the additional extracurricular suspension.
46
 The 
court found for the school, but overtly avoided the question of whether 
the sixty-day extracurricular suspension comprised a property interest 
requiring procedural due process.
47
 
A concurring judge addressed this issue, however, and argued that 
the majority opinion “implicitly acknowledges that [the student] has a 
protected property interest in his continued participation in 
extracurricular activities.”
48
 The judge further argued that distinguishing 
extracurricular activities from other academic activities is becoming an 
inappropriate distinction: 
[T]he notion upon which many of the New Jersey cases rely—that 
participation in extracurricular activities is a mere privilege as 
opposed to a right—is fast becoming outdated. Indeed, courts and 
commentators increasingly attack the “privilege” versus “right” 
distinction. Although New Jersey may not be constitutionally 
obligated to establish and maintain a system of extracurricular 
activities, many of its public schools, nevertheless, have done so. 
The New Jersey statutes implicitly acknowledge the importance of 
extracurricular activities. Public funds support the schools’ various 
“extracurricular” activities. Further, the Commissioner of Education 
has required teachers to supervise such activities when called upon 
to do so. Most importantly, a growing consensus indicates that the 
programs are not “extra” curriculars, but rather, are an integral part 
of the whole curriculum. Authority in New Jersey does support the 
proposition that “each pupil has a right to the opportunity to 
participate in interscholastic athletics and other extracurricular 
 
44 Id. at 92. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 91. 
47 “Resolution of this appeal does not require that we address the issue found dispositive 
by the ALJ and the district court – whether procedural due process is required whenever a 
public school student in New Jersey faces or receives for a breach of discipline solely a 
suspension from participation in his or her school’s athletic program.” Id. The court instead 
reviewed the property interest in the 60-day extracurricular suspension in conjunction with 
the 10-day suspension that was levied. Id.  
48 Palmer by Palmer, 868 F.2d at 96 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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activities.
49
 
Based in large part on this reasoning, the judge concluded that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would today find “a protected interest in 
participation in extracurricular activities, assuming eligibility 
requirements are met.”
50
 
Assuming arguendo that this concurring judge is correct and 
procedural due process rights apply to extracurricular discipline, it is 
highly questionable how school districts could constitutionally 
discipline for off-campus offenses. As discussed earlier, due process in 
student disciplinary matters “minimally requires adequate notice, an 
opportunity for a hearing, and substantial evidence to support the 
penalty.”
51
 When a student commits an offense at school, school 
administrators act on accounts from school employees or students who 
corroborate and provide evidence relating to the alleged offense. But for 
alleged offenses that occur off-campus, evidence arises from either a 
police report or a third-party account that is somehow relayed to school 
administrators. Illustrating this, some school districts have used mere 
“Facebook posts” that confirmed “gossip” about a house party where 
there was alcohol as sufficient evidence to discipline a student.
52
 
It is difficult to imagine that unsubstantiated online chatter and 
other third-party sources amount to substantial evidence, as required 
under procedural due process.
53
 For example, as previously discussed, 
the Freehold Regional School District in New Jersey revokes a student’s 
parking permit after having an off-campus motor vehicle accident for 
the year or “until [the] legal system determines student to be innocent of 
charges.”
54
 The policy makes clear that the school district will suspend a 
parking permit before the student has an opportunity to contest his or 
her traffic citation in municipal court. As this illustrates, the current 
procedures for administering 24-hour codes have a significant potential 
to lack the requisite procedural due process. 
While some may argue that procedural due process is inappropriate 
for school discipline, past cases have shown the benefits of procedural 
due process in the proper adjudication of student discipline. As 
 
49 Id. at 98-99 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
50 Id. at 99 (Cowen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
51 Swem, supra note 41, at 366 (citations omitted). 
52 Terruso, supra note 27. 
53 See Palmer by Palmer, 868 F.2d at 93. 
54 See supra note 33. 
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discussed in the introduction, the Wayne Hills superintendent suspended 
nine football players for an alleged off-campus assault pursuant to 
police accounts without granting the players a procedural due process 
hearing.
55
 The students later received a hearing before the school board, 
at which point the students produced evidence that “at least three of the 
accused players weren’t present” during the alleged assault.
56
 The school 
board then stayed the suspensions, with the school board president 
noting, “[t]he evidence presented at the hearing, which the board and 
the superintendent had not previously had access to, raised substantial 
concern regarding the nature and extent of the involvement of some of 
the students in the incident . . . The stay was placed so that additional 
facts and information could be considered.”
57
 As these comments 
demonstrate, procedural due process hearings provide an essential 
opportunity for a school district to consider any facts that contradict the 
third-party account that the school is otherwise relying on. 
In creating the student procedural due process right, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that notice and a hearing protect a student from 
“unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process, with all its 
unfortunate consequences,” such as damage to “the students’ standing 
with their fellow pupils as well as interfere[nce] with later opportunities 
for higher education and employment.”
58
 This notion is keenly 
applicable to the growing adoption of 24-hour codes, where without 
procedural due process, school administrators are subjecting students to 
discipline based on third-party accounts without even hearing a 
student’s side of the story. 
From a legal standpoint, if courts find that there is a property 
interest in extracurricular discipline or parking permits, then there is a 
significant likelihood that the disciplinary process of 24-hour codes 
would fail to meet procedural due process requirements. But even if 
courts conclude that there is no property right to trigger procedural due 
process, states ought to consider the fairness of student discipline under 
frameworks where school districts know they are not required to afford 
students notice and a hearing—let alone find substantial evidence of 
off-campus misconduct. As such, states should consider legislation that 
would codify the constitutional safeguards afforded under procedural 
 
55 McGrath, supra note 8. 
56 McGrath, supra note 15. 
57 Id. 
58 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575, 579 (1975). 
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due process. 
B. Substantive Due Process Challenges to 24-Hour Codes 
Parents have alleged that 24-hour codes violate their parental rights 
under the federal constitution.
59
 In Meyer v. Nebraska, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees parents the right to 
“establish a home and bring up children” and “to control the education 
of their own.”
60
 In subsequent cases, the Court has reaffirmed this 
substantive due process right as “protect[ing] the fundamental right of 
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children.”
61
 
The Third Circuit interpreted this right and its interaction with 
public schools in Greunke v. Seip, in which a high school swim coach 
asked a female swimmer to submit to a pregnancy test.
62
 The court 
concluded “there may be circumstances in which school authorities, in 
order to maintain order and a proper educational atmosphere in the 
exercise of police power, may impose standards of conduct on students 
that differ from those approved by some parents.”
63
 However, when “a 
school’s policies might come into conflict with the fundamental right of 
parents to raise and nurture their child[ren] . . . the primacy of the 
parents’ authority must be recognized and should yield only where the 
school’s action is tied to a compelling interest.”
64
 Thus, the court 
established that the Fourteenth Amendment’s parental rights subject 
certain school district actions to strict scrutiny analysis. 
In a recent Third Circuit case that addressed school discipline, the 
court rejected a parents’ substantive due process claim.
65
 In J.S. v. Blue 
Mountain School District, a student was disciplined for online speech 
that “ma[de] fun of her middle school principal.”
66
 While the court 
reversed the student’s discipline on First Amendment grounds, the court 
 
59 See Complaint, Bernal-Silva v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, No. 207CV02941, 2009 
WL 1873401 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2009).  
60 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923). 
61 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
62 Greunke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2000). 
63 Id. at 304 (“[F]or some portions of the day, the children are in the compulsory 
custody of state-operated school systems,” where “the state’s power is ‘custodial and 
tutelary.’”); see also Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655, 664-65 (1995). 
64 Greunke, 225 F.3d at 305 (emphasis added).  
65 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
66 Id. 
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rejected the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
claim.
67
 The court held “the parents’ liberty interest will only be 
implicated if the state’s action ‘deprived them of their right to make 
decisions concerning their child,’ and not when the action merely 
‘complicated the making and implementation of those decisions.’”
68
 
Based on this, the Third Circuit held that the school discipline did not 
prevent the parents “from reaching their own disciplinary decision” or 
force the parents “to approve or disapprove of [the student’s conduct].”
69
 
Further, the court held the ten-day suspension in question was 
insufficient to trigger a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.
70
 
In a matter regarding 24-hour codes, the parents of a student who 
attended a Ramapo, New Jersey high school asserted a substantive due 
process claim in their challenge to a school policy that made any state or 
municipal offense subject to school discipline.
71
 In a preliminary 
decision, an administrative law judge held that the school district’s 24-
hour code violated the parents’ substantive due process rights.
72
 He 
asserted that “dealing with charges against a teenager unrelated to 
school is the proper function of the parents without interference from 
school authorities,” and that this “is particularly true when the student’s 
alleged misconduct occurred in the parent’s home.”
73
 Based in part on 
this constitutional violation, the administrative law judge struck down 
the Ramapo 24-hour code.
74
 The Commissioner of Education and the 
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division avoided this 
constitutional question, however, and decided the case on strictly 
statutory grounds.
75
 
Given this jurisprudence, 24-hour codes have the potential of 
violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s parental substantive due process 
right. While a federal court has not yet ruled in favor of a parent in a 
 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 934 (citing C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 184 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 934, 922. 
71 G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l 
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. I), EDU 11579-09, Initial Decision (June 11, 2010). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l 
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. II), EDU 11597-09, Final Decision (Sept. 13, 2010) (“In light of 
the fact that [the district policy] does not comply with [state law], there is no need to explore 
the constitutional arguments made by the petitioner and discussed by the ALJ.”).  
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case concerning student discipline for off-campus conduct, the growing 
number of 24-hour codes creates the likelihood of a legal challenge on 
these grounds. So long as a court finds that a 24-hour code implicates a 
parent’s right “to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of their children,” as the New Jersey administrative law judge in 
the Ramapo, New Jersey case held, the relevant 24-hour code will be 
subject to strict scrutiny review.
76
 
While proponents believe that the policy goals of 24-hour codes 
are laudable, it is difficult to argue that school discipline for conduct in 
the home is narrowly tailored to address a compelling government 
interest. As 24-hour codes expand in the scope of conduct that they 
cover, they become less likely to satisfy a heightened standard of 
review. Accordingly, the policies have the potential of violating parental 
constitutional rights. Given the possibility that school districts can be 
disciplining in an unconstitutional manner with these policies, it is 
imperative that legislatures address the issue of 24-hour codes with 
legislation that ensures school districts’ policies comport with parental 
constitutional rights in the disciplining of students. 
C. Public Policy Problems in 24-Hour Codes 
School districts have passed 24-hour codes disciplining students 
for off-campus traffic offenses, drinking offenses, and other misconduct 
that are tangentially related to the school environment. While such 
misdeeds are not to be condoned, this paper questions the policy 
wisdom behind school disciplinary action to address these out-of-school 
issues. In this section, this paper will discuss a multitude of policy 
rationales that have been offered by numerous parties and weigh against 
24-hour codes. 
First, this Note holds that courts are the best venue for adjudging 
criminal conduct that occurs away from school. As established under 
state criminal law, the judicial system is fitted with the tools and 
procedures needed to ensure that the safety concerns of the community 
are addressed.
77
 Further, courts provide a better venue for assessing a 
student’s danger to the community than schools.
78
 Since off-campus 
misconduct constitutes a violation of state or municipal law, it is only 
 
76 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
77 Randee J. Waldman & Stephen M. Reba, Suspending Reason: An Analysis of 
Georgia’s Off-Campus Suspension Statute, 1 J. MARSHALL L.J. 1, 67 (2008). 
78 Id. at 68. 
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fitting that the criminal justice system governs the disciplinary regime 
for the offending citizen, who in these instances merely happens to be a 
public school student. 
Second, this Note asserts that 24-hour codes unwittingly create a 
“double penalty” factor that is inequitable to students. If a student is 
charged with an offense outside of school, he or she is subject to the 
relevant criminal laws and is prosecuted accordingly. As criminal 
statutes are designed to “maintain order in society,” they are already 
written to incorporate the criminal law goals of deterrence, 
incapacitation, and retribution.
79
 In this light, subsequent school 
discipline simply adds an additional consequence on top of the 
underlying criminal penalty.
80
 
As articulated by others who have written on this subject, 24-hour 
codes can be characterized as an “overreaction on the part of the school 
authorities” that “offends our sense of justice,” because “‘a precept of 
justice [is] that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to the offense.’”
81
 Since school policies “are adopted to 
preserve order in the school environment,” schools should not play a 
role in supplementing criminal statutes.
82
 As Holmdel Township Board 
of Education member Ana Vander Woude stated in opposing a 24-hour 
code, students “are already being punished [by the criminal justice 
system] if the infraction occurs and [if] it is [then] channeled through 
the school district for a second type of penalty . . . it would be 
overlegislating.”
83
 In this instance, Vander Woude opposed Holmdel’s 
aforementioned policy of revoking a student’s campus parking privilege 
for off-campus traffic offenses that have already been enforced by the 
municipal court system.
84
 
 
 
 
79 James M. Peden, Through a Glass Darkly: Educating with Zero Tolerance, 10 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 376 (2001). 
80 Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies Turned into a 
Nightmare? The American Dream’s Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity Grounded 
in Brown v. Board of Education, 9 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 289, 321 (2005). 
81 Peden, supra note 79, at 370 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 347, 367 
(1910)). 
82 Id. at 376. 
83 Jacqueline Hlavenka, Police will notify school of student traffic tickets, INDEPENDENT 
(Monmouth Cty., N.J.), Oct. 8, 2009, http://ind.gmnews.com/news/2009-10-
08/schools/005.html. 
84 Id. 
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Third, this Note finds that removing students from extra-curricular 
activities for off-campus violations runs counter to the goals of reducing 
off-campus misconduct. With respect to correcting teenage behavior, 
research has shown that “responding with services that help adolescents 
identify errors, recognize options, and make better choices is more 
developmentally appropriate than a purely punitive response.”
85
 Further, 
researchers have found that “instead of removing students, schools 
should implement programs designed to train adolescents’ still-
developing brains to make good decisions.”
86
 Empirically, studies have 
shown that students who are suspended or expelled are more likely to 
drop out of school and become “psychologically damaged.”
87
 They also 
are more likely to exhibit a variety of poor behaviors.
88
 Based on these 
considerations, it is apparent that troubled students are best served by 
remaining in an educational environment, rather than being suspended 
and left apt to commit further off-campus malfeasance.
89
 
In a similar vein, 24-hour codes that remove students from 
extracurricular activities reduce the very social benefit provided by 
extracurricular activities. Empirical studies indicate that participation in 
extracurricular activities reduces the rates of early school dropout, 
especially among students at the highest risk of dropping out.
90
 If a 
student receives an extracurricular suspension for consuming alcohol 
off-campus, kicking the student off the football team will remove the 
student from an activity that is proven to reduce delinquency. In these 
cases, 24-hour codes run counter to the merits of extracurricular 
programs, namely keeping at-risk youth engaged in school instead of 
walking the streets. 
Finally, this Note submits that 24-hour codes unnecessarily expose 
school districts to potential tort liability. In a Mountain Lakes, New 
Jersey case, police detained a star high school basketball player on a 
 
85 Waldman, supra note 77, at 12-13. 
86 Id. at 13. 
87 Hanson, supra note 80, at 289, 330-31. 
88 Suspended students are more likely to become involved in a physical fight, carry a 
weapon, smoke, use alcohol and drugs, have sex, drop out of school, feel isolated from 
society, and commit further offenses. Melanie Riccobene Jarboe, Note, “Expelled to 
Nowhere”: School Exclusion Laws in Massachusetts, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 343, 349-
50 (2011). 
89 Id. 
90 Joseph L. Maloney & Robert B. Carins, Do Extracurricular Activities Protect Against 
Early School Dropout, 33 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 241, 248 (1997).  
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weekend night, contending she was leaving the scene of a house party.
91
 
During this encounter, the student maintained that she did not consume 
alcohol, and in the end the police never filed any charges against the 
student.
92
 Regardless, and based solely on the police account, the high 
school suspended the girl from the basketball team.
93
 Her parents sued, 
arguing that their daughter’s basketball suspension was unfounded and 
caused her to lose collegiate scholarship opportunities.
94
 The parents 
alleged numerous torts against the local school district and police 
department, including tortious interference with a prospective economic 
advantage and defamation.
95
 While the case was never tried, the local 
police department settled for $50,000 and the school district settled for 
an undisclosed amount.
96
 Given these settlements, one must ask whether 
public school districts should assume such liability arising from 
discipline for off-campus conduct. As 24-hour codes grow in 
prevalence, there are likely to be many similar tort claims brought after 
instances of unfounded discipline. Considering school districts are 
publicly funded, 24-hour codes can recklessly expose taxpayers to 
liability whenever off-campus discipline is improperly sanctioned. 
Based on these considerations, this Note submits that 24-hour 
codes present numerous public policy shortcomings. Under 24-hour 
codes that are currently in operation, school districts are unilaterally 
taking punitive measures that are duplicative of those already taken by 
the criminal justice system. At the same time, these actions troublingly 
expose school districts to tort liability while unwittingly removing at-
risk students from schools. 
For the policy and legal reasons discussed in this section, this Note 
submits that states must craft laws that curtail the application of 24-hour 
codes to specific areas where they are both constitutional and necessary 
for the safety of a school’s operation.
97
 The next section will discuss 
 
91 Complaint, Bernal-Silva v. Borough of Mountain Lakes, 2009 WL 1873401 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 3, 2009). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Eugene Paik, Mountain Lakes pays $50K to settle suit by former basketball standout, 
STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 2, 2010, 
http://www.nj.com/news/local/index.ssf/2010/02/mountain_lakes_pays_50000_to_s.html.   
97 For example, as a school board member, the author of this note promoted specific 
instances where school intervention into off-campus affairs is justifiable: 
“‘If there was a party over the weekend and there were two groups that get into 
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how several states have attempted to limit the scope of off-campus 
discipline, pursuant to principles this note supports, and yet school 
districts have routinely exceeded these limitations. 
III. Lack of Compliance with State Laws that Govern 24-Hour Codes 
A. Overview of Laws Governing 24-Hour Codes 
School discipline for off-campus conduct has historically been 
sanctioned in specific instances where student conduct “poses a threat 
or danger to the safety of other students, staff or school property or 
disrupts the educational program of the school.”
98
 For example, in New 
Jersey, a 1970 case laid the groundwork for the present restrictions on 
off-campus discipline.
99
 In R.R. v. Board of Education of Shore Regional 
High School District, a New Jersey court reviewed a student’s 
suspension for an out-of-school altercation.
100
 The court said it was 
unable to find a New Jersey decision holding that school officials had 
the power to expel or suspend a student for conduct away from school 
grounds.
101
 As a result, the court looked to other jurisdictions and 
secondary sources, and fashioned a rule that school officials may 
discipline a student for conduct away from school only when it is 
“reasonably necessary for the student’s physical or emotional safety and 
well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of other 
 
a fight and the police are aware of it, [school administrators] need to know what 
happened because there could very well be spillover into the building,” Collins 
said . . . ‘There are many different circumstances beyond the scope of the 
imagination where administrative intervention is appropriate and necessary, but 
I do believe that our policies, namely the alcohol and driving policies, 
incorporate instances where [the conduct] fails [to] materially and 
substantially’” interfere with the school’s operation, as required under state 
statute. 
Jacqueline Hlavenka, Holmdel BOE to amend controversial off-campus policy, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Monmouth Cty., N.J.), Oct. 21, 2010, http://ind.gmnews.com/news/2010-10-
21/Schools/Holmdel_BOE_to_amend_controversial_offcampus_polic.html.  
98 Ronald D. Wenkart, Discipline of K-12 Students for Conduct Off School Grounds, 
201 ED. LAW REP. 531, 531 (2006). 
99 R.R. v. Bd. of Ed. of Shore Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 263 A.2d 180 (N.J. Super. 1970); 
see G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 427 N.J. 
Super. 246, 263 (2012) (“The two-pronged test set forth in N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.6 is derived 
from the trial court’s decision in R. R. v. Board of Education of the Shore Regional High 
School District . . .”). 
100 Id. at 182. 
101 Id. at 184. 
COLLINS NOTE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:53 AM 
366 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 37:2 
students, teachers or public school property.”
102
 
Many state laws follow this court’s approach, and overall, there is 
a national trend towards limiting 24-hour codes to a “reasonableness” 
standard that reaches only certain conduct that directly affects the 
school environment.
103
 For example, in Connecticut, the legislature 
passed a law that only allowed 24-hour codes to reach off-campus 
conduct that “markedly interrupts or severely impedes the day-to-day 
operation of a school.”
104
 The state teacher’s union president supported 
this standard, saying the legislature’s task is to balance “students’ [due 
process] rights and the rights of a class which may be disrupted [as well 
as the rights of an] individual who is assaulted or harassed.”
105
 Similarly, 
Georgia legislators restricted off-campus discipline to specific offenses 
where a student “could be charged” with a felony.
106
 The Georgia law 
also contains a second requirement that the conduct “makes the 
student’s continued presence at the school a potential danger,” which 
the law’s legislative sponsor said is “key” to avoid having school 
districts disciplining students for off-campus offenses that do not affect 
the school environment.
107
 
B. New Jersey Law Governing 24-Hour Codes 
In order for school districts to discipline students for off-campus 
conduct, they must have the legal authority to do so. In New Jersey, a 
local school board’s power is “no greater than the authority conferred 
by statute.”
108
 Therefore, to establish disciplinary authority, the state 
must statutorily authorize the student discipline.
109
 To this end, the New 
Jersey State Board of Education has administrative rulemaking power 
 
102 Id. at 184; see N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6 (quoted language adopted in 
administrative code). 
103 Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Right to discipline pupil for conduct away from school 
grounds or not immediately connected with school activities, 53 A.L.R.3D 1124 (1973). 
104 Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117, 134 (Conn. 1998). 
105 Id. at 133. 
106 Waldman, supra note 77, at 32-33. 
107 Id. at 33. 
108 G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l 
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. III), EDU 13033-10, Initial Decision (July 6, 2011). 
109 Waldman, supra note 77, at 32 (“First, [a statute] must be examined to determine if 
the Legislature intended to limit the student behavior that school districts can punish. 
Second, if it is determined that the statute does create limits, school districts’ code of 
conduct provisions regulating the punishment of off-campus behavior must be examined to 
determine compliance with those limits.”). 
COLLINS NOTE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:53 AM 
2013] ARE PRINCIPALS DRIVING THE COP CAR? 367 
and has promulgated rules addressing 24-hour codes.
110
 The relevant rule 
authorizes discipline for off-campus offenses in specific cases: 
(a) School authorities have the right to impose a consequence on a 
student for conduct away from school grounds, including on a school 
bus or at a school-sponsored function, that is consistent with the 
district board of education’s code of student conduct, pursuant to 
N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.1. 
1. This authority shall be exercised only when it is reasonably 
necessary for the student’s physical or emotional safety, security and 
well-being or for reasons relating to safety, security and well-being 
of other students, staff or school grounds, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 
18A:25-2 and 18A:37-2. 
2. This authority shall be exercised only when the conduct which is 
the subject of the proposed consequence materially and substantially 
interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school. 
3. The consequence pursuant to (a) above shall be handled in 
accordance with the district board of education approved code of 
student conduct, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.1, and as appropriate, 
in accordance with N.J.A.C. 6A:16-7.2, 7.3, or 7.5.
111
 
Pursuant to this administrative rule, New Jersey school districts may 
sanction off-campus discipline by enacting 24-hour codes at the local 
level, subject to the limits set forth in state law.
112
 School boards must 
publicly vote to approve the 24-hour codes, and typically include them 
as part of the district’s student code of conduct.
113
 
By passing laws that govern 24-hour codes, states are addressing 
two important considerations that were promoted in the previous 
section. First, states are addressing the policy concerns about having 
school districts involved in discipline for off-campus conduct. In this 
respect, state statutes serve to “ensure[] that a school board is unable to 
 
110 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:11-1 (“The board shall . . . [e]nforce the rules of the state 
board . . . [and p]erform all acts and do all things, consistent with law and the rules of the 
state board, necessary for the lawful and proper conduct, equipment and maintenance of the 
public schools of the district.”). 
111 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6. 
112 Waldman, supra note 77, at 32. 
113 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.1 (New Jersey requires that “[e]ach district board of 
education . . . develop, adopt and implement a code of student conduct which establishes 
standards, policies and procedures.”); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-1.4 (“Each 
district board of education shall develop and adopt written policies, procedures, mechanisms 
or programs governing . . . [d]evelopment and implementation of a code of student conduct . 
. .”). 
COLLINS NOTE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:53 AM 
368 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 37:2 
usurp the parental role unless a child’s off-campus conduct interferes 
with the school’s legitimate custodial role.”
114
 Second, these state laws 
help provide a statutory framework for school districts to follow, 
helping “ensure that school board authority is exercised consistently 
with [applicable] constitutional protections.”
115
 
C. School District 24-Hour Codes Found to Exceed 
Governing State Laws 
Despite some state laws that explicitly define when school districts 
may discipline students for off-campus conduct,
116
 as discussed in the 
previous section, there is evidence that school districts enact policies 
that exceed these state laws. In one such case, a parent whose child 
attended a Ramapo, New Jersey high school successfully challenged a 
24-hour code for exceeding state law.
117
 The school district policy in 
question established as a school conduct violation any violation of the 
New Jersey criminal code or relevant municipal codes.
118
 The New 
Jersey Commissioner of Education struck down this 24-hour code, 
finding that it “encompasse[d] too many potential conduct violations 
that [did] not meet the elements” required under state law before off-
campus discipline is permitted.
119
 The Commissioner further held the 
state law governing off-campus conduct “emphasizes the notion that 
there must be some link between the conduct and the school 
environment” for discipline to be sanctioned.
120
 
The school district appealed this decision to the Superior Court of 
New Jersey, Appellate Division.
121
 On appeal, the school district alleged 
the Commissioner (1) misinterpreted the term “consequence” in the 
state code and (2) rendered a decision that is inconsistent with other 
statutes that promote responses by school authorities to “substance 
 
114 Brief for American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 10, G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. 
Dist., 427 N.J. Super. 246 (App. Div. 2012). 
115 Id. at 7. 
116 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6. 
117 G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l 
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. II), EDU 11597-09, Final Decision, at 3 (Sept. 13, 2010). 
118 Id. at 1, 3. 
119 Id. at 7. 
120 Id. (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6.) 
121 G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 427 N.J. 
Super. 246 (2012). 
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abuse and bullying.”
122
 To start, the court found that the term 
“consequence” should be interpreted according to its common meaning, 
thus rendering a mandatory meeting with school administrators and/or 
suspensions for extracurricular activities subject to state statute.
123
 
Further, the court agreed with the Commissioner that the statute requires 
any off-campus conduct subject to discipline to have a “nexus” to the 
“orderly administration of the school,” thus affirming the striking down 
of the broad Ramapo policy.
124
 
While the Ramapo lawsuit represents only one school district that 
violated state law, there is empirical evidence that school districts 
regularly ignore state laws restricting off-campus discipline. Legal 
researchers studied the disciplinary policies passed by local school 
boards in Georgia and compared them to the off-campus discipline 
requirements established under applicable state law.
125
 Georgia law 
allows schools to punish for off-campus conduct only if a student (1) 
“acted in a way ‘which could result in the student being criminally 
charged with a felony[,]’” and (2) “that action . . . ‘makes the student’s 
continued presence at school a potential danger to persons or property at 
the school or which disrupts the educational process.’”
126
 The 
researchers found that Georgia school districts have regularly “gone 
beyond the command” of this law.
127
 Specifically, they found that a 
“majority of districts” maintained policies that deviated from state 
law.
128
 The school district policies were inconsistent with Georgia’s 
statute for many reasons, including (1) completely abandoning the 
felonious behavior requirement and incorporating non-criminal activity, 
(2) including a broad range of behaviors that are not limited to felonies, 
(3) converting the two-part test into an either/or test, or (4) adding 
broadening language to the list of acts subject to punishment.
129
 
When school districts promulgate policies that deviate from state 
law, they are “expos[ing] students to punishment for off-campus 
behavior beyond the authority granted by the Legislature.”
130
 Given this 
 
122 Id. at 257-58, 264; see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6. 
123 G.D.M., 427 N.J. Super. at 262. 
124 Id. at 266. 
125 Waldman, supra note 77, at 30. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 37. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
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current potential for school districts to discipline students in a manner 
that violates state law, it is incumbent on legislatures to pass more 
detailed laws that directly address the legality of 24-hour codes and 
better ensure school district compliance with state law. 
D. 24-Hour Codes Held Unconstitutionally Vague As 
Enforced 
Besides potentially exceeding state law, student discipline for off-
campus conduct can also create an unconstitutional application of state 
law.
131
 In one such instance, high school senior Kyle Packer was pulled 
over in his local Connecticut town for not wearing a seat belt.
132
 During 
the traffic stop, the police officer arrested Packer for drug possession 
after spotting a marijuana cigarette, performing a car search, and finding 
drug paraphernalia along with two ounces of marijuana.
133
 After learning 
of Packer’s arrest, the local school board held a hearing and voted to 
expel Packer for a semester and prohibit him from extracurricular 
activities for a year.
134
 
Packer sued to reverse his expulsion. Under Connecticut state law, 
a student may only be disciplined for off-campus conduct when the 
conduct is “seriously disruptive of the educational process.”
135
 The court 
reviewed this off-campus discipline statute, applied it to the facts of 
Packer’s case, and said: 
“A person of ordinary intelligence, apprised only of the language [of 
the state law] and our prior interpretation . . . of similar language, 
could not be reasonably certain whether possession of marijuana in 
the trunk of a car, off school grounds after school hours, is, by itself 
and without some tangible nexus to school operation, ‘seriously 
disruptive of the educational process’ as required by [state law] in 
order to subject a student to expulsion.”
136
 
Under the void for vagueness doctrine,
137
 the court found 
 
131 Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117, 124 (Conn. 1998). 
132 Id. at 121. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 122-23. 
135 In Connecticut, state law allows districts to discipline for off-campus conduct if the 
conduct is (1) violative of a publicized board policy and (2) “seriously disruptive of the 
educational process.” Packer, 717 A.2d at 122 n.7 (Conn. 1998) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
10-233(d)(a)(1)). 
136 Packer, 717 A.2d at 130. 
137 “The void for vagueness is a procedural due process concept that originally was 
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Connecticut law did not provide Packer with sufficient notice that his 
marijuana possession would be subject to school discipline, and 
reversed his expulsion accordingly.
138
 
While this decision is only dispositive under the operative facts, it 
highlights the ways in which school districts can unconstitutionally 
apply state statutes governing off-campus conduct. In the Packer case, 
the school district made its own determination that Packer’s marijuana 
arrest was “seriously disruptive of the educational process,” as required 
under state law to expel him.
139
 But the court rejected this conclusion by 
the school board, holding that the school’s interpretation of state law is 
“irrelevant” to a void for vagueness claim and that proper constitutional 
notice must only come from the statute itself and relevant judicial 
interpretations.
140
 
On a void-for-vagueness basis alone, many currently enacted 24-
hour codes are potentially unconstitutional applications of state law. For 
example, in New Jersey, the relevant state law requires that off-campus 
conduct “materially and substantially” interfere with the school’s 
operation before it can become subject to discipline.
141
 Elucidating this 
statutory phrase, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division 
struck down the Ramapo policy which subjected any criminal offense to 
school discipline, writing: “[A] student could be suspended from 
participating in extracurricular activities as the result of receiving a 
citation for littering on a municipal sidewalk. Nothing in [the state 
statute] can be read to endorse such a result.”
142
 Based on this holding, 
 
derived from the guarantees of due process contained in the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States constitution.” Id. at 125. It requires a statute (1) provide 
“fair warning . . . in language that the common world would understand, of what the law 
intends to do if a certain line is passed[,]” and (2) “establish minimum guidelines to govern 
their enforcement.” Id. 
138 “To summarize, we conclude that . . . the statute, as drafted, did not provide the 
plaintiff with constitutionally adequate notice that possession of two ounces of marijuana in 
the trunk of his car off the school grounds in the town of Morris, after school hours, without 
any tangible nexus to the operation of Thomaston High School, would subject him to 
expulsion[.]” Id. at 134. 
139 The school district argued the arrest met this standard because (1) the student’s 
brother was present for the arrest, causing his friends at school to become aware of the 
arrest, (2) a former high school student who is a known drug user was present for the arrest, 
and (3) teachers had approached the principal with respect to the arrest. Id. at 122. 
140 Id. at 131, 134. 
141 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 6A:16-7.6. 
142 G.D.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist., 427 N.J. 
Super. 246, 266 (2012). 
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does an off-campus speeding ticket, which is currently addressed by 
some New Jersey 24-hour codes, meet this standard, or would it fail 
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine?
143
 
In this light, many 24-hour codes that are currently enforced by 
school districts have the potential of being unconstitutionally void for 
vagueness under state law. As a result, legislatures must pass new laws 
that better address 24-hour codes. Such laws must provide sufficient 
guidance so that school officials are not left to make discretionary 
decisions that are unconstitutionally vague as applied under the 
governing state statute. 
E. Judicial Standards Resulting in 24-Hour Codes Evading 
Review 
Even when parents or students undertake the effort of challenging 
a 24-hour code, they face obstacles presented by the judicial standards 
of review that apply to school disciplinary decisions. In cases where 
students seek prompt review, legal recourse is typically only available 
through an emergent relief petition. Such a petition, while heard 
promptly by a judge, is subject to a heightened standard of review.
144
 In 
the Wayne Hills case, as discussed in the introduction, the suspended 
student athletes sued seeking emergent relief, as their suspensions 
jeopardized participation in a state championship football game that was 
less than one week away.
145
 There, the New Jersey Commissioner of 
Education held that the students were unable to sustain their burden of 
proof under the state’s emergent relief standard.
146
 This meant the 
students could not demonstrate, as required by law, a likelihood of 
prevailing on the underlying merits of the suit or that the legal right 
underlying their claim was settled law.
147
 
 
143 See supra notes 33-35. 
144 In New Jersey, emergent relief may be granted if the judge determines from the 
proofs that (1) the petitioner will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not 
granted, (2) the legal right underlying the petitioner’s claim is settled, (3) the petitioner has a 
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim, and (4) when the equities and 
interests of the parties are balanced, the petitioner will suffer greater harm than the 
respondent will suffer if the relief is not granted. Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 
(1982). 
145 L.A. ex rel R.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Wayne, EDU 14241-11, Initial Decision (Dec. 1, 
2010). 
146 L.A. ex rel R.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Wayne, EDU 14241-11, Final Decision (Dec. 2, 
2010). 
147 L.A., supra note 145. 
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On another legal point, the administrative law judge emphasized 
that the Wayne Township Board of Education’s decision to suspend the 
football players was entitled to deference.
148
 Citing case law, the judge 
held that a school board “has broad discretion to take the actions needed 
to effectively operate its public schools,” and that based on this 
standard, a court “will not substitute [its] judgment for that of the board 
of education” unless there is “a finding that the action below was 
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.”
149
 As a result, the judge said the 
students “have to demonstrate that the Board acted in bad faith, or in 
utter disregard of the circumstances before it.”
150
 The judge concluded 
the board “amply demonstrated a nexus” between the alleged incident 
and school operations, and that “the Board’s determination that [the 
accused students] should not be permitted to participate in extra-
curricular activities is entitled to deference by the Commissioner.”
151
 
As an attorney for the Wayne Hills football players pointed out in 
an interview, the administrative law judge and the Commissioner of 
Education never actually reached “a decision on the underlying merits 
of the case.”
152
 Rather, the case was dismissed because of the players’ 
inability to overcome the emergent relief and deference standards.
153
 
With these heightened standards of review applied to school 
disciplinary decisions, there is effectively no judicial review of school 
administrative decisions. This is a rather troubling reality, as school 
administrators are left to interpret state law with effectively no appeal to 
determine the legality or constitutionality of their decision making. As 
the Connecticut Supreme Court noted in Packer, school administrators 
are not constitutionally “authorized to construe” state law.
154
 Therefore, 
legislatures should pass new laws that ensure students and parents can 
obtain some form of due process review under 24-hour codes, thus 
ensuring that state law is properly interpreted and applied in the school 
setting. 
 
148 Id. (citing Thomas v. Morris Twp. Bd. of Educ., 89 N.J. Super. 327, 332 (App. Div. 
1965), aff’d, 46 N.J. 581). 
149 Id.; Kopera v. W. Orange Bd. of Educ., 60 N.J. Super. 288, 294 (App. Div. 1960). 
150 L.A., supra note 143. 
151 Id. 
152 McGrath, supra note 25 (The education commissioner “wrote that lawyers proved 
the players would suffer irreparable harm by not playing in the championship game, but that 
lawyers failed to prove that they are likely to win their underlying appeal of the 
suspensions.”). 
153 Id. 
154 Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117, 131 (Conn. 1998). 
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F. Structural Reasons Causing School Districts to Exceed 
State Law 
Besides legal considerations, there are several structural reasons 
why state laws governing 24-hour codes are often ignored by school 
districts. These factors include disincentives for school board members 
to oppose the implementation of 24-hour codes, incentives for school 
administrators to support 24-hour codes, as well as disincentives for 
parents to challenge 24-hour codes. Based on these realities, it is 
incumbent on state legislatures to create regimes that better ensure 
school districts comply with the laws they promulgate. 
First, there are political disincentives for school board members to 
oppose 24-hour codes when they are proposed at the local level. For 
example, the Holmdel, New Jersey Board of Education passed a policy 
that disciplines students for motor vehicle violations occurring outside 
of school.
155
 Holmdel High School principal William Loughran 
promoted the policy at a board of education meeting, arguing “it’s one 
of those things that defines the values of a community . . . [f]rom our 
perspective we think it’s a good thing.”
156
 Despite concerns raised by 
board members about the policy violating state law, the board majority 
repeatedly approved the policy over dissent.
157
 One board member 
openly disagreed with the policy, but was persuaded by the principal 
into supporting the 24-hour code, saying “[i]f [the students] are safer 
because of something we are doing, then we have to go with that.”
158
 As 
this quote highlights, it is politically challenging to oppose a measure 
that school administrators argue promotes student safety—even if it 
likely violates state law. 
 
 
 
155 See Hlavenka, supra note 35. 
156 Id.  
157  The Holmdel Township Board of Education voted 5-4 to defeat a motion to place a 
moratorium on the off-campus driving policy. Proponents of the moratorium, 
including the author of this Note, argued the off-campus policy exceeded the scope 
of state law: “‘We cannot establish some link as required in the statute,’ Collins 
said. ‘[The policy] amounts to a blanket authorization . . . that is illegal and in 
violation of statute.’” 
 Jacqueline Hlavenka, Holmdel Board of Education split on off-campus policies, 
INDEPENDENT (Monmouth Cty., N.J.), Oct. 7, 2010, http://ind.gmnews.com/news/2010-10-
07/Front_Page/Holmdel_Board_of_Education_split_on_offcampus_poli.html. 
158 Hlavenka, supra note 35. 
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The actions in the Ramapo, New Jersey school district further 
illustrate the political difficulty for school board members to oppose 24-
hour codes on legal grounds. In this district, Superintendent Paul Saxton 
advocated for a 24-hour code after conducting a survey in 2005 that 
revealed high percentages of high school students consume alcohol at 
home without parental knowledge.
159
 Supposedly in response, Saxton 
and the board of education passed a 24-hour code meant to be a 
“deterrent of drug and alcohol abuse” that subjected students to 
discipline for any off-campus conduct that resulted in an alleged 
“violation of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, and/or 
applicable municipal codes or ordinances.”
160
 The New Jersey 
Commissioner of Education struck down this 24-hour code for violating 
state law.
161
 Remarkably, the school board then passed another proposed 
24-hour code that made minimal changes—and which was also struck 
drown in a subsequent facial challenge.
162
 This back-and-forth reinforces 
that there are political disincentives for school board members to 
oppose 24-hour codes when proposed, even if courts have struck down 
previous iterations of the policy. 
Second, there are potential incentives for school administrators to 
advocate for 24-hour codes, even if they may violate state law. To this 
point, school boards and school administrators have repeatedly argued 
they should be able to define state law as it relates to student 
discipline.
163
 With such autonomy to interpret state law, though, school 
administrators and board members have the potential “to indulge their 
personal predilections.”
164
 For example, some school administrators have 
 
159 G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l 
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. I), EDU 11597-09, Initial Decision (June 11, 2010). 
160 G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l 
High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. II), EDU 11597-09, Final Decision (Sept. 13, 2010). 
161 Id. 
162 An administrative law judge held that the newly-written policy suffers from the same 
infirmity as the original policy. G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the 
Ramapo Indian Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. I), EDU 11579-09, Initial Decision 
(June 11, 2010). 
163 The Connecticut Association of Boards of Education argued that school board 
members should be able to define applicable state law as they see fit, holding “the board 
members’ knowledge and experience . . . enable[s] them to put a framework to a situation 
and determine if a situation is serious enough to warrant expulsion.” Brief for Conn. Ass’n 
of Bds. of Educ. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1998). 
164 Brief for Conn. Civil Liberties Union Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1998) 
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personal views that can color the interpretation of the applicable state 
law. In the Ramapo school district, the superintendent made clear that 
he personally supported a 24-hour code because he openly believed 
parents were failing at raising their children.
165
 Similarly, Superintendent 
Barbara Duncan of the Holmdel Township Public Schools advocated for 
a 24-hour code because she believed the school district properly acted 
as a student’s parent during the school day.
166
 
Beyond personal beliefs, there are also educational incentives that 
weigh on school districts to discipline and remove poorly behaved 
students.
167
 Researchers reviewed school policies intended to increase 
the number of suspensions and found that schools are incentivized to 
remove these students because they often score poorly on standardized 
exams, parents want disruptive students out of their children’s 
classrooms, and teachers can get rid of troublemakers.
168
 Overall, there 
are incentives for school administrators and board members to support 
24-hour codes regardless of legal concerns. 
Finally, there are also disincentives for parents to challenge 24-
hour codes. The Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation stated 
there is an overall “difficulty in challenging the decisions of school 
officials.”
169
 To this end, research has shown that in school matters, 
“many parents often do not have the mindset, time, or means to pursue 
redress.”
170
 Further, when parents actually do have the resources to sue, 
they often end up feeling “ostracized, frustrated, and unsuccessful” in 
challenging the school system.
171
 With this reduced likelihood that 
parents will take the time to challenge 24-hour codes in court, there is 
an increased likelihood that illegal 24-hour codes will evade judicial 
review. 
 
(“Permitting expulsion for conduct away from school that is deemed to be ‘seriously 
disruptive of the educational process’ invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and 
permits school officials to indulge their personal predilections.”). 
165 “If I thought the parents were dealing with them, we wouldn’t be doing this,” he said 
in an interview. G.D.M. and T.A.M. o/b/o B.M.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ramapo Indian 
Hills Reg’l High Sch. Dist. (B.M.M. I), EDU 11579-09, Initial Decision (June 11, 2010). 
166 “I don’t see the school being so distant from the family . . . Basically, we are filling 
the role of being a parent to a student during the day.” Hlavenka, supra note 83. 
167 Jarboe, supra note 88, at 353. 
168 Id. 
169 Brief for Conn. Civil Liberties Union Found. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Packer v. Bd. of Educ. of Thomaston, 717 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1998). 
170 Hanson, supra note 80, at 295. 
171 Id. 
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Overall, as this section discusses, there are several perverse 
structural reasons that can lead to school district noncompliance with 
state law. As a result, corrective legislation is needed to ensure that state 
laws are properly complied with at the local level and that districts do 
not continually “expose[] students to punishment for off-campus 
behavior beyond the authority granted by the Legislature.”
172
 
IV. Proposed Legislation and Conclusions 
As explained in the previous sections, 24-hour codes present 
numerous legal and policy concerns. In many cases, the codes have the 
potential of violating students’ procedural due process rights and 
parents’ substantive due process rights.
173
 At the same time, they 
constitute poor public policy for a variety of reasons, including taking 
at-risk youth away from extra-curricular programs that would help them 
and otherwise creating a double penalty that supersedes the criminal 
justice system.
174
 
Currently, many states, including New Jersey, have rightfully 
passed laws that restrict school discipline for off-campus offenses to 
specific instances.
175
 School districts, however, have repeatedly 
exceeded these state laws,
176
 and given the standards of review that 
apply in such cases, there is little to no judicial review to ensure school 
district compliance with state law.
177
 In this light, states should pass laws 
that more effectively circumscribe the practice of discipline for off-
campus conduct. In order to attain this goal, this Note recommends 
legislation that takes into account the following considerations. 
First, the law should cite the specific criminal offenses that are 
potentially subject to school discipline for off-campus conduct. This 
would prevent indecorously broad interpretations of the law by school 
districts, such as those holding that minor traffic offenses directly affect 
a school’s operation. This section of the law should also expressly state 
that school districts cannot discipline for offenses that are not 
enumerated in the statute.
178
 
 
172 Waldman, supra note 77, at 37. 
173 See supra Part 2A, 2B. 
174 See supra notes 78-79. 
175 See supra note 110. 
176 See supra Part 3C. 
177 See supra Part 3E. 
178 Waldman, supra note 77, at 31. 
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Second, the law should create a due process appeal as of right to 
the local school board whenever discipline for off-campus conduct 
occurs. This would reduce the likelihood of school administrators 
potentially making determinations in contradiction of the applicable 
state law, as in the Packer case.
179
 Further, this would also create a 
procedural due process opportunity to receive notice and a hearing, as 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment when there is a constitutionally-
protected liberty interest involved.
180
 
Third, the law should establish a more permissive standard of 
review in case a student files a challenge to off-campus discipline with 
the New Jersey Department of Education. Currently, between the 
emergent review and deference standards, the Commissioner of 
Education cannot reverse a board decision absent bad faith by a school 
board. This should change so that a student can receive a proper review 
of a school board’s final decision to ensure compliance with state law, 
rather than being prevented from obtaining review based on applicable 
judicial standard. 
Finally, the law should restrict discipline for off-campus conduct to 
suspensions that are remedial to ensuring the safety of the school 
environment. This would allow the criminal justice system to serve its 
goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution, while the school 
codes would serve to preserve order in the school environment.
181
 This 
would also ensure that the school discipline does not violate substantive 
due process by assuming a parental role in the upbringing of a child.
182
 
Further, it would ensure that students are not counterproductively 
removed from extracurricular activities that prove beneficial in 
preventing misconduct.
183
 
Although arguably well-intentioned, 24-hour codes create larger 
problems than the ills they are supposedly intended to address. As 
discussed in the introduction, in less than one month, the Wayne Hills 
football players accused of off-campus malfeasance had their eligibility 
status changed three times. This convoluted process did not make 
national headlines because of the troublesome allegations against the 
players, but rather the confusion over whether the school could have or 
 
179 See generally Palmer by Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 93 (3d Cir. 1989) 
180 Id. 
181 See Peden, supra note 79; Hanson, supra note 80. 
182 See generally Hanson, supra note 80. 
183 See Hanson, supra note 80. 
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should have disciplined the students. To this point, according to most 
accounts, the Wayne Hills school environment never became dangerous 
because of fallout from the alleged assault, but rather because of the 
public controversy over the players’ status.
184
 If state law had defined 
and limited the school’s role regarding this off-campus incident, there 
would have been no public controversy. But ambiguity in the law led to 
incredulity among the public. 
This Note does not dispute the duty and need of a school district to 
maintain an orderly school environment. The 24-hour codes that are 
currently being promulgated by school districts, though, exceed this role 
and instead extend schools into a troubling area with harsh policy and 
legal consequences. As a result, states must take affirmative steps to 
prevent school districts from becoming mired in the adjudication of 
tangential off-campus misconduct. This can straightforwardly be 
accomplished through passage of new state laws that are drafted in 
accordance with this Note's recommendations. With such reform, law 
enforcement can focus on enforcing the law, teachers can focus on 
teaching, and students can focus on learning. What is more, 
administrators can focus on running their schools, such that principals 
are not, figuratively, driving the cop car. 
 
184 Bob Cook, Wayne Hills Football 9 Who Were Out, Then In, Are Out Again, 
FORBES.COM, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2011/11/28/wayne-hills-
football-9-who-were-out-then-in-are-out-again/ (“[T]he board said things had changed, 
including the ‘reversal by the high school principals, which now, is that this issue is 
disrupting the daily operations in the buildings.’”). 
